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Abstract. This section deals with the network neutrality debate to define the 
economic relationships between Internet access providers and (distant) content 
providers. We review the various definitions of what should be a neutral net-
work, the outcome of all international consultations on the topic, and the argu-
ments of network neutrality proponents and opponents. 
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1 Introduction 
The Internet has known an uncontested success during the past two decades, having 
evolved from an academic network interconnecting researchers who exchange infor-
mation, to a commercial network accessed by all individuals, made of private access, 
content, and interconnected transit providers, and over which all type of commerce or 
content exchange can be performed. Complex relations between those often non-
cooperative actors have raised discussions about whether or not and how current tele-
communications businesses and technological models should be sustained.  
A specific question that we want to discuss in this section is the economic relations 
between Content Providers (CP), i.e., organizations or individuals creating informa-
tion, educational or entertainment content, and Internet Service Providers (ISP), i.e., 
the companies or organizations providing access to the network.  
In the current Internet business model, ISPs charge both end-users and CPs directly 
connected to them, the economic relations between interconnected ISPs being gener-
ally through public peering or transit agreements. But a key fact is that ISPs do not 
charge CPs that are associated with other ISPs, and do not treat their traffic in a dif-
ferent way. In addition, there is a specific layers (or Tiers) structure in the relations 
between ISPs. The so-called « Tier 1 » operators are defined as operators that can 
reach every other network without any form of fee. Tier 1 operators peer with all  
other Tier 1 operators. Tier 2 operators on the other hand have to settle peering 
agreements with other networks, to reach some portions of the Internet. Usually, those 
operators purchase their traffic to a Tier-1 network rather than discussing with other 
Tier 2 operators (because it is easier to implement).  
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But this business model has been questioned, especially because there is now an 
important asymmetry in the traffic volume exchanges between ISPs, mainly due to 
some prominent and resource consuming content providers. The typical example is 
YouTube (owned by Google), accessed by all users while hosted by a single Tier 1 
ISP, and whose traffic constitutes now a non-negligible part of the whole Internet 
traffic. Moreover, while transit revenues made by ISPs are constantly decreasing, 
content providers revenues are increasing. As an illustration, it is predicted (by Jupiter 
Research) for 2012 an amount of $34.5 billion in online advertising spending in the 
USA only, while the transit costs are believed to be under 1$ per Mbps by 2014. This 
issue has been the reason why Ed Whitacre, CEO of AT&T, launched the debate 
about revenue sharing and the business model of the Internet in 2005 [8]. Basically, 
Ed Whitacre claimed that distant CPs use the AT&T network for free in order to reach 
end users, and that it could not be economically sustained: they should be charged by 
ISPs they are not directly connected to, especially because of the decreasing transit 
prices. Indeed, the ISPs do not have any incentive to invest into a network architec-
ture, by improving the actual one or by implementing a new one. Another manage-
ment possibility to differentiate CPs, not related to charging, has been implemented 
by the USA provider Comcast in 2007, which blocked P2P applications such as Bit-
Torrent, under the argument that P2P content is mostly illegal. 
All this has led to a strong protest from CPs who are losing accessibility or quality 
of service, and from user associations claiming that it is an infringement of freedom 
of speech. This raised the so-called Network Neutrality Debate, bringing questions at 
the same time at the economical, legal, technical, and political levels. The purpose of 
this section is to review the proposed definitions of network neutrality, a notion ac-
tually not formalized, to summarize the outcomes of the international consultations 
held very recently, and to describe and discuss the arguments of both proponents and 
opponents of neutrality to allow the reader to make her own conclusions. 
It is important to remark that even governments somewhat see the position of CPs 
as an issue, in accordance with ISPs complaint. In France for instance, there is a wor-
ry about the online advertising revenue not being taxed as usually done, and a propo-
sition on that matter has been released (see [13]). Between 10 and 20 million Euros 
could be collected in taxes from the USA providers such as Google, Microsoft, Yahoo 
and Facebook. 
2 Network Neutrality Definitions 
Maybe surprisingly, there is no clear and generally admitted definition of network 
neutrality. A network is often said to be weakly neutral if it prohibits user discrimina-
tion [11,12], which means it does not charge users differently for the same service, 
but can differentiate between applications (example: video having a priority with 
respect to email because of more stringent QoS requirements). It is said to be strongly 
neutral if in addition it prohibits any service differentiation that is if it does not allow 
managing packets differently. 
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A tentative of « official » definition of neutrality was made in 2005 in the USA by 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) stating that network neutrality could 
be summarized into four items [3]: (1) no content access can be denied to users (2) 
users are free to use the applications of their choice (3) they can also use any type of 
terminal, provided it does not harm the network (4) they can competitively select the 
access and content providers of their choice. This corresponds exactly to the well-
known proposition/definition has been described by Professors Timothy Wu and 
Lawrence Lessig; summarized by Tim Wu, “Network neutrality is best defined as a 
network design principle. The idea is that a maximally useful public information net-
work aspires to treat all content, sites, and platforms equally.” 
3 International Consultations 
The debate has been so strong, and the potential impact of a regulation or non-
regulation so important that governments have held public consultations. This has 
started in the USA, but and also recently in France (by ARCEP, the French regulator), 
UK (by Ofcom) and by the European Commission (EC) in 2010, after Norway (by the 
Post and Telecommunications Authority, NPT) and Sweden (by the post and Telecom 
Agency, PTS) in 2009.  In that same year, the FCC has imposed neutrality regulatory 
rules, a decision that has been appealed by an operator, Verizon. The goal of those 
consultations was to (re)design an Internet that suits the interests of all actors (con-
sumers, broadband service providers, entrepreneurs, investors, and businesses of all 
sizes) thanks to the most appropriate trade-off. Even if everyone was allowed to re-
spond to the consultation, it has mainly been answered by specialists such as comput-
er scientists, industry lobbies and non-governmental organizations. The participation 
was different across the countries, and when individuals were responding, they were 
largely defending neutrality.  
One of the most important outcomes/recommendations is that traffic management 
has to be transparent, in the sense that operators have to clearly explain what they are 
implementing. This is also considered as being a manner to avoid anti-competitive 
behaviors from operators and to control if a minimal best-effort Internet is in place.  
Transparency has been a consensus among all industrial telecommunication actors.   
ARCEP proposes that operators provide all clear and relevant information on access, 
QoS, and limitations (if any) [1,10]. 
Another key idea is to protect customers’ rights to access content, which cannot be 
forbidden, i.e., the network should be open, which is defined as allowing “end users in 
general to access and distribute information or run applications of their choice” [2]. 
Another aspect is quality of service (QoS). A result of consultations is the demand 
to define a minimum level of QoS (which has to be defined), for a type of universal 
access principle. Weak neutrality and service degradation would be allowed if such a 
minimum level is reached. No regulator seems to have something against discrimina-
tion if a minimum QoS is guaranteed. It is even considered that a total lack of traffic 
management could result in a lower perceived QoS for users. In this sense, being  
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neutral and open does not necessarily mean that all bits have to be considered equal. 
The FCC advocates for a “reasonable network management” vaguely defined as “ (a) 
reasonable practices employed by a provider of broadband Internet access service to 
(i) reduce or mitigate the effects of congestion on its network or to address quality-of-
service concerns; (ii) address traffic that is unwanted by users or harmful; (iii) prevent 
the transfer of unlawful content; or (iv) prevent the unlawful transfer of content; and 
(b) other reasonable network management practices” [4]. This could be realized as 
soon as transparency is fulfilled.  
All those aspects mean that the Internet needs to be supervised and monitored by 
regulators to verify if the above proposed rules are satisfied. It is a proposition for and 
from all regulators, even outside the European Union. In addition, it is asked in the 
EU (where the EC is entitled to impose rules) to forbid operators to block users from 
accessing legal content. ARCEP has been more stringent, asking for non-
discrimination between Internet traffic streams [1]. 
A last recommendation is that neutrality requirements should be different depend-
ing on whether we consider mobile or fixed networks, because (1) capacity is much 
more limited in the mobile case, (2) because of mobility itself, which has to be han-
dled by operators, and (3) because of the larger type of attached devices (phones, 
smart-phones, netbooks, broadband cards), complicating the management. Traffic 
management has, therefore, to be more flexible in the case of mobile networks, due to 
their specificities [1]. 
The impact of the decisions made after those consultations is of great importance at 
the global political level too. Indeed, as highlighted by FCC Commissioner’s Robert 
M. McDowell [5], several countries were waiting for the USA (and E.U.), and some 
regulatory decisions could be used to justify and expand their own government au-
thority over the Internet, but with the motivation to limit the freedom of speech. This 
has to be taken into account when taking decisions.  
4 Arguments of Neutrality Proponents: An Idealistic  
and Humanist View 
The Internet architecture is based on the notions of layers, as defined by the Open 
Systems Interconnection model (OSI model). Almost all layers are managed by inde-
pendent entities (or providers). The OSI model abstracts the network into seven layers 
(physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation, application) and each 
entity at a given level interacts only with the layer beneath it, and provides “capaci-
ties” to the layer above it, the relations between layers being operated thanks to stan-
dardized protocols. In the real Internet, this model can be simplified into a model 
made of four layers [6, 7]: the content layer (web pages, emails, telephone calls, vid-
eo, etc.), the application layer (the software permitting the content to be developed), 
the logical layer (TCP/IP, domain names, all the protocols), and the physical layer 
(cables, routers, servers, wireless base stations). If there is no neutrality, there is a 
major risk that this successful and cheap model will be destroyed because ISPs may  
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reduce competition by developing exclusivity arrangements with content and applica-
tion providers, and use proprietary protocols between layers that may harm the devel-
opment of new applications by third parties. Changing the structure and the way the 
Internet has been designed can be dangerously harmful. Without neutrality; it is 
claimed that the last mile ISPs, who have the market power, will discriminate between 
content providers, favoring the ones that are connected to them, so that end users will 
have less choice, which is claimed to be economically inefficient (what economists 
contest, see the next subsection). This market power (whoever is the most powerful) 
is said to be a reason to introduce regulation to maintain innovation at the content 
level. Similarly, having an important level of innovation from CPs will foster access 
demand of end users and therefore increase or maintain revenues of ISPs. 
A main principle attached to the networking (disaggregated) layer architecture, and 
described as a key factor, is that the network can hardly make a differentiation accord-
ing to the identity. This is related to an important issue developed by the neutrality 
proponents: the freedom of speech on the Internet [7, 8]. If the network is not open, 
this simplifies a lot its control by governments or political entities willing to limit 
information diffusion and retrieving the identity of correspondents. The current 
layered architecture on the other hand allows a relative anonymity, a decentralized 
distribution (which makes it easy and cheap to implement), the possibility to reach 
multiple access points, no simple system to identify content, and tools of encryption; 
this is exactly what is needed by political parties to speak up in an oppressive country. 
This political aspect is hardly taken into account by neutrality opponents and econo-
mists, but we can note that the current infrastructure has very probably helped the 
recent Arabic revolutions with all the information exchanged. Changing it could harm 
the development of democratic values worldwide. 
In general also (not only talking about freedom of speech), vertical integration of 
content and access, as aimed by non-neutrality proponents, especially in an exclusive 
way, is seen as discriminatory by users and by regulators. Considering other commu-
nication areas which have a longer history, such as roads, canals, mail, etc., there has 
always been a requirement of interconnection and to serve the public, even if re-
sources are owned by private companies. 
And the argument of ISPs that revenues decrease and investments are not possible 
anymore are contested because ISPs keep those cost values secret; if they were more 
transparent, data could be verified and they could be trusted. It is rather seen that ISPs 
want to earn money from both ends: end users and CPs. 
Finally, a last important reason for neutrality is universality (as above on interna-
tional consultations): all consumers are entitled to reach meaningful content, whatever 
the technical limitations of their service. They are also entitled to attach any type of 
device to the network; and to run any application. The basic idea behind that principle 
is to keep all the population informed and able to communicate, and not to increase 
the gap between rich and poor people. French government for instance is currently 
trying to set up an access for the poor at a limited price. 
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5 Arguments of Neutrality Opponents: An Economic View 
As presented in the introduction, the initial reason of ISPs to deviate from a neutral 
behavior is the disincentive to invest in networking capacities because of the reduced 
revenues, an issue argued to be often forgotten by neutrality defenders who always 
seem to focus on CPs innovation only. 
The most important argument is that vertical integration, which consists in bun-
dling content and access into a single service, and which can be exclusive for some 
type of content, is often shown to be the most efficient economically. It has indeed 
been demonstrated by the Chicago school of antitrust analysis that vertical arrange-
ments can even be efficient under a monopoly, because a monopolist can gain from a 
higher total value of the whole platform (made of access plus content). A typical ex-
ample, in another but related context, is Microsoft that, while in a quasi-monopole on 
the operating systems of computers, gains from the development of applications be-
cause it increases its own value (the equivalent of Microsoft being here either the ISP 
or the CP). The Chicago school of antitrust analysis has more exactly proved that 
there are preconditions under which vertical integration might be harmful: 1) the ver-
tically integrated firm must have market power in its market (to be able to use this 
powerful position), and 2) the market in which the considered provider will be inte-
grated must be concentrated and protected by barriers to entry [7]. It is claimed that 
none of those preconditions are met in the current telecommunication industry, and 
therefore vertical integration would be more efficient than keeping the current neutral 
model. Vertical integration has for example been successful in cable television in the 
80s in the USA, with cable operators investing a lot in the network to be able to re-
spond to demand for content. 
In addition, the Internet is rather seen now as a media (i.e., content distribution) 
business, and should then be treated as such rather than as a classical telepho-
ny/telecommunication economic business facility. Indeed, users go on the Internet not 
for broadband in itself, which is rather a mean, but for the content, goods and services 
that they can find. As a consequence, vertical integration is therefore more relevant 
here because in such media business, distribution (broadband access for us) is gener-
ally bundled with content. We can remark that it is already implemented, even if in a 
limited way: almost all ISPs provide a portal over which users can access a predefined 
content: (selected) news, direct access to some content, etc. This does not prevent 
(yet) the users from accessing the content of their choice, but is an incentive to go to 
the one preferred by the ISP.  
But vertical integration is not a new topic, it has always been in discussion in the 
Internet industry, and is not a new issue. Notable examples are when Microsoft incor-
porated its web browser into its operating system, introducing a major debate, or 
when AOL (an ISP) and Time Warner (a CP) merged. 
It is even advocated that, contrary to the intuition, vertical integration and non-
neutrality would enforce competition at the network (ISP) level [7]. This is for in-
stance what happened between cable and DSL providers in the USA, who drastically 
decreased their price because of the competition, at the benefice of end users; they 
also may fight on content. As an illustration, we can cite the competition between 
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cable and satellite TV in the USA: (satellite) DirecTV managed to get an exclusivity 
on the Sunday night NFL game, which could then not be accessed by subscribers of 
cable operators, except if they paid in addition for the satellite operator.  This put 
pressure on the historic cable operators to improve their content, to innovate in this 
direction and to develop competition. A neutral network would not have permitted the 
development of DirecTV. In addition, it is anyway unlikely that ISPs would decide to 
cut the access to major CPs, such as Amazon, Facebook, etc., because they would 
immediately face protests and pressure from their subscribers. 
Similarly, allowing the ISPs to differentiate service would increase the economic 
efficiency and social welfare, by responding to the heterogeneity of users in terms of 
preferences. This means applying revenue management techniques [9] to telecommu-
nications as it has been done in the airline industry, hostelling, etc., with a success that 
has not been discussed in those areas. Users would benefit from this, since they would 
be able to choose the offer most adapted to their preferences, and it may even drive to 
more services attuned to segments of the population. It is even claimed that the intro-
duction of regulation could favor some applications against others, an undesirable 
effect. Also, differentiation and market segmentation would allow many ISPs to sur-
vive, since if not implemented, declining costs otherwise usually result in a limited 
amount of surviving companies and natural monopolies. As a last remark on service 
differentiation, we can note that the network “naturally” makes some differentiations 
anyway: a protocol like TCP gives less throughput to users far away, and BGP allows 
to discriminate at routers. 
Opponents of neutrality, even if they admit that the success of the Internet is due to 
the end-to-end architecture, believe that it is not a reason for not changing it now: it 
has the right to evolve because of economical changes. Even more, writing in the 
stone a rule because it initially worked might be really harmful. It is not because the 
architecture has been optimal that it will continue to be. They rather see this immo-
bility reaction as a scare of change from computer scientists, not ready to lose the 
“baby” they gave birth to, but the Internet users are in general not highly skilled  (in 
opposition to early subscribers to the network) and are not that sensitive to this issue. 
As mentioned by A. Thierer [7, Page 94]: “If consumers really wanted a pure dumb 
Net connection, then why does AOL’s walled garden have over 30 million subscribers 
worldwide while charging $23.90 per month?”. We do not know exactly what will be 
the next business model, but there is no reason to necessarily keep the one in place. 
Even at the CP level, vertical integration is said to be preferable because it may 
help (especially in a segmented market) to push applications that have a limited im-
pact. Using proprietary protocols for development and distribution could simplify the 
advent of new applications, and thus foster innovation thanks to a larger range of 
networking tools. And as the above example on the NFL games shows, competitive 
ISPs have an incentive to help content developers in a non-neutral regime, particularly 
when there is a monopoly for some type of content. Interoperability, even if appealing 
a priori, is not necessarily efficient from an economic point of view. 
Promoting a universal access to the network is also contested by neutrality oppo-
nents. They believe that this may harm investment because there is no real incentive 
in that situation for ISPs to invest in capacity and technologies if access is granted, 
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this even more if service differentiation is not permitted:  how to define access prices 
if access is mandatory? This universal access could maybe be discussed for applica-
tions such as web browsing or email, but not for bandwidth-consuming applications. 
In addition, it is argued that the full connectivity as a principle to maximize social 
welfare does not take into account an important component: the congestion that end 
users will experience if there are no sufficient investments on capacities or technolo-
gies by ISPs. 
This universality principle has been somewhat questioned by governments too. As 
an illustration, France has passed a law in 2009 that disconnects users from the Inter-
net if they download illegally copyrighted material. Even if this has raised a debate at 
the law level (the French Constitutional Council asked to modify its implementation 
because it was in contradiction with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen coming from the French revolution: the ISPs will not decide by themselves to 
filter traffic, but will implement the decision if it comes from a judicial authority), 
such a law has been enforced (the so-called HADOPI law), even if the Internet has 
been seen as a mean to exercise the freedom of speech. This differentiates the treat-
ment of legal and illegal traffic, but the notion of legality being considered differently 
in other countries, this could go against freedom of speech. 
It is also remarked by neutrality opponents that imposing a regulation on neutrality 
would just add or shift power (even) closer to CPs, especially in the case where there 
is a limited competition. Typically, Google would become even more powerful with 
YouTube that already accounts for an important part of the whole Internet traffic.  
Even at the security level, a vertically integrated service is advocated to ease the 
control of attacks (because the current model is more or less based on trust and coop-
eration between communicating nodes) and limit illegal content, something of interest 
for regulators.  
6 Conclusions 
As sketched by our presentation, the network neutrality debate can rather be seen as 
the opposition between (1) an idealistic (neutral or weakly neutral) network as im-
agined initially by scientists, with an organization in layers, a low cost, and for which 
end-to-end connectivity and universality are the key issues, and (2) a purely economic 
(non-neutral) view of the network. The goals of both worlds are therefore different 
and make a strict comparison difficult.  
A question is then: are end-users and computer scientists just scared of the poten-
tial change? Or is it too risky and could it potentially lead to a “telecommunication / 
connectivity” crisis? Would it be accepted by the public as easily as it accepted the 
Internet in its current form? We wish the reader to make her own opinion on the sub-
ject and hope that our discussion will be helpful towards that goal.  
We may mention a particular case where neutral and non-neutral networks  
coexist: the road network, where you have commercial (highway) roads with tolls, 
and national roads, with a lower quality of service, but that are free of charge and 
allow (in most countries) a full connectivity. Those national roads are maintained by 
states, and one could check how this (economic) model could be transferred to  
telecommunications.  
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An important remark to conclude this section is about another neutrality threat, that 
could be viewed as the most “dangerous” and that is not mentioned enough, the 
search engine neutrality. To illustrate the problem, Google’s CEO, Eric Schmidt, 
actually had to testify in September 2011 before the US Senate about a possible dis-
crimination in the ranking of the searches on the engine, because it is claimed by 
some to favor the content provided by Google itself. Typically, but not only, favoring 
YouTube in front of competitors such as Dailymotion. Search engines are indeed very 
important actors in the current Internet, being the mean by which most content is 
reached. Their activity can greatly influence the way the network is used and their 
behavior has to be carefully reviewed too. Because of that, Google is facing a risk to 
be dismantled under the antitrust law.  
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